Abstract. In this paper I generalize the landmark Levy-Solovay Theorem [LevSol67] , which limits the kind of large cardinal embeddings that can exist in a small forcing extension, to a broad new class of forcing notions, a class that includes many of the forcing iterations most commonly found in the large cardinal literature. The fact is that after such forcing, every embedding satisfying a mild closure requirement lifts an embedding from the ground model. A consequence is that such forcing can create no new weakly compact cardinals, measurable cardinals, strong cardinals, Woodin cardinals, strongly compact cardinals, supercompact cardinals, almost huge cardinals, or huge cardinals, and so on.
in a small forcing extension by their relation to the measures existing already in the ground model.
Historically, the Levy-Solovay theorem addressed Gödel's hope that large cardinals would settle the Continuum Hypothesis (ch). Gödel, encouraged by Scott's [Sco61] theorem showing that the existence of a measurable cardinal implies V = L, had hoped that large cardinals would settle the ch in the negative. But since one can force the ch to hold or fail quite easily with small forcing, the conclusion is inescapable that large cardinals simply have no bearing whatsoever on the Continuum Hypothesis. Expressed in this terminology, the Levy-Solovay theorem asserts that after small forcing every measure in the ground model both lifts and extends to a measure in the forcing extension and, conversely, every measure in the extension both lifts and extends a measure in the ground model.
The truth, however, is that in the large cardinal context most small forcing is, as it were, too small. Rather, one often wants to perform long iterations going up to and often beyond the large cardinal κ in question. With a supercompact cardinal κ, for example, one often sees reverse Easton κ-iterations along the lines of Silver forcing [Sil71] or the Laver preparation [Lav78] . What we would really like is a generalization of the Levy-Solovay theorem that would allow us to understand and control the sorts of embeddings and measures added by these more powerful and useful forcing notions.
Here, I prove such a generalization. For a vast class of forcing notions, including the iterations I have just mentioned, the fact is that every embedding j : V [G] → M [j(G)] in the extension that satisfies a mild closure condition lifts an embedding j : V → M from the ground model. In particular, every measure in V [G] concentrating on a set in V extends a measure on that set in V . From this general fact, I deduce that forcing of this type creates no new weakly compact cardinals, measurable cardinals, strong cardinals, Woodin cardinals, supercompact cardinals, or huge cardinals and so on.
The class of forcing notions for which the theorem applies is quite broad. All that is required is that the forcing admit a gap at some δ below the cardinal κ in question in the sense that the forcing factors as P * Q where P is nontrivial, |P| < δ and Q is ≤δ-strategically closed. (A forcing notion is ≤δ-strategically closed when the second player has a strategy enabling her to survive through all the limits in the game in which the players alternately play conditions to build a descending (δ + 1)-sequence through the poset, with the second player playing at limit stages.) The Laver preparation, for example, admits a gap between any two stages of forcing.
Indeed, in the Laver preparation, the tail forcing is fully directed closed, not merely closed or strategically closed. And the same holds for many of the other reverse Easton iterations one commonly finds in the literature. Moreover, in practice one can often simply preface whatever strategically closed forcing is at hand with some harmless small forcing, such as the forcing to add a single Cohen real, and thereby introduce a gap at δ = ω 1 . Further, becauseQ can be trivial, gap forcing includes all small forcing notions. Examples of useful gap forcing notions are abundant.
An embedding j : V → M is amenable to V when j ↾ A ∈ V for any A ∈ V .
Gap Forcing Theorem. Suppose that V [G] is a forcing extension obtained by
forcing that admits a gap at some δ below κ and j : any kind of ultrapower embedding is a lift.
In order to avoid confusion on a subtle point, let me remark that given any My proof will proceed through a sequence of lemmas. A variation of the Key Lemma first appeared in [Ham98a] and [Ham98b] and was subsequently modified and appealed to in [HamShl98] , but to be thorough I include the proof here. Other important techniques are adapted from Woodin's proof of the Levy-Solovay Theorem for strong cardinals (see [HamWdn] ); indeed, Woodin's techniques are peppered amongst the proofs of several of the lemmas below, and I could not have proved the theorem without them.
Let me define that a sequence in a forcing extension is fresh when it is not in the ground model but all of its proper initial segments are. Thus, it is a new path through a tree in the ground model. Key Lemma 1. If |P| ≤ β, Q is ≤β-strategically closed and cof(θ) > β, then P * Q adds no fresh θ-sequences.
Proof: It suffices to consider only sequences of ordinals. Furthermore, since any fresh θ-sequence of ordinals below ξ may be easily coded with a fresh binary sequence of ordinal length ξ · θ, which has the same cofinality as θ, it suffices to prove only that no fresh binary sequences are added. So, suppose towards a contradiction that τ is the P * Q-name of a fresh binary θ-sequence, so that
Since P is nontrivial, by refinining below a condition if necessary we may assume it adds a new subset of some minimal γ ≤ β, so that for some nameḣ:
For every condition p,q ∈ P * Q let b p,q be the longest sequence b such that p,q b ⊆ τ . Note that cof(θ) > β is preserved by both P and Q.
I claim that a certain weak Prikry property holds, namely, that there is a condition p,q such that for for any λ < θ and any stronger condition of the form p,ṙ there is an even stronger condition of the form p,ṡ that decides τ ↾ λ. That is, below p,q the first coordinate need not change in order to decide more and more of τ . To see why this is so, suppose g * G is V -generic for P * Q. For every
must be that a single condition p is used for unboundedly many p λ . Thus, in fact, this condition p could have been used for every λ. So for every λ there is a namė q such that p,q ∈ g * G decides τ ↾ λ. By strengthening p if necessary, we may suppose that this state of affairs is forced by a condition of the form p,q . What this means is that for any λ and any stronger p,ṙ there is an even stronger p,ṡ that decides τ ↾ λ, as I claimed.
Since no condition decides all of τ , it follows from this that for any condition p,ṙ ≤ p,q there are namesṙ 0 andṙ 1 such that p,ṙ 0 , p,ṙ 1 ≤ p,q and
Now I will iterate this fact by constructing in V a binary branching tree whose paths represent (names for) the first player's plays in the game corresponding tȯ Q. Using a nameσ that with full boolean value names a strategy witnessing thaṫ Q is ≤β-strategically closed in V P , the basic picture is that while the second player obeysσ, the tree will branch for the first player with moves corresponding to the conditionsṙ i given by the previous paragraph. Specifically, I will assign in V to each t ∈ 2 <γ a nameq t so that along any branch in 2 γ the condition p forces that the names give rise to the first player's moves in a play throughQ that accords with the strategyσ. That is, the next move is always belowσ of the previous moves. The first player begins withq ∅ =q. Ifq t is defined, letṙ t be the name of the condition obtained by applying the strategy against the play up to this point, i.e. the play in which the first player playsq s for s ⊆ t. By induction, p forces that these conditions give rise to a play according toσ, and so p forces thatṙ t is stronger than allq s for s ⊆ t. Now, by the previous paragraph the first player may reply with eitherq tˆ0 orq tˆ1 chosen so that p,q tˆi ≤ p,ṙ t and b p,q tˆ0 ⊥ b p,q tˆ1 . Similarly, if t has limit ordinal length, then since the strategy is forced to be winning for the second player, there will be a conditionṙ t that is the result of the strategyσ applied to the previous play q s | s t , and we may therefore have the first player choose anẏ q t such that p,q t ≤ p,ṙ t in order to continue the iteration. The effects of this construction are first, that whenever t ⊆t, then p,qt ≤ p,q t , and second, that
h =ḣ g be the new γ-sequence added by P; let q t = (q t ) g be the interpretation of the names constructed in the previous paragraph; and let σ = (σ) g be the interpretation of the strategy. By the assumption onḣ, every initial segment t h lies in V . By construction, the sequence q t | t h represents the plays of the first player in a play that accords with the strategy σ. Thus, since the strategy is winning for the second player, there is a condition r below all of them (i.e. the γ th move). Thus, r forces that b = ∪ t h b p,q t is a proper initial segment of τ , and consequently b ∈ V . By construction, however, for any t ∈ 2 <γ we know t ⊆ h exactly when b p,q t ⊆ b, since whenever tˆi first deviates from h the construction ensures that b p,q tˆi deviates from b. We conclude that h ∈ V , a contradiction. Lemma
Let me now continue with the proof of the theorem. Suppose that V [G] is a forcing extension obtained by forcing that admits a gap at δ < κ and j :
g * H ⊆ P * Q is V -generic for nontrivial forcing P with |P| < δ and Q is ≤δ-strategically closed. The embedding can therefore be written as j :
. I may assume that δ is regular, since it might as well be |P| + . Since the critical point of j is κ, every set in V κ is fixed by j. It follows that V κ = M κ . In the next few lemmas, I will show even more agreement between M and V .
Lemma 2. Every set of ordinals
Proof: Since σ has size δ, it must be in both V [g] and M [g]. Thus, using the names in V and M , there are sets s 0 ∈ V and s 1 ∈ M of size δ such that σ ⊆ s 0 and σ ⊆ s 1 . Iterating this idea, bouncing between sets in M and sets in V , we can build in V [G] an increasing sequence of sets σ = σ α | α < δ such that σ 0 = σ, α < β → σ α ⊆ σ β , and for cofinally many α, σ α ∈ V and for cofinally many α,
Thus certainly σ ⊆ τ and τ has size δ. It remains to show
By the strategic closure of Q we know σ ∈ V [g], and so it has a namė s ∈ V . Since cofinally often σ α ∈ V , there must be conditions in g forcing each instance of this, but since |P| < δ and δ is regular, a single condition p ∈ g must work unboundedly often, and decide unboundedly many elements ofṡ. Thus, p also decides the union, and so τ ∈ V . Similarly, by the closure of the embedding it must be that σ ∈ M [j(G)] and consequently by the strategic closure of j(Q) actually
Thus, it has a nameṫ ∈ M , and again because cofinally often σ α ∈ M there must be a single condition p ∈ g deciding unboundedly many many elements ofṫ. Thus, this condition decides the union, and so τ ∈ M , as desired. Lemma Lemma 3. M and V have the same δ-sequences of ordinals.
Proof: It suffices to show that [ord] δ is the same in M and V . Suppose that σ ⊆ ord has size δ and σ is in either M or V . By the previous lemma there is a set τ ∈ V ∩ M of size δ such that σ ⊆ τ . In both M and V we may enumerate τ = { β α | α < γ } in increasing order, where γ = ot(τ ) < δ + . Let A = { α | β α ∈ σ }. This set is definable from σ and τ and therefore must be in either M or V , respectively, as σ is in either M or V . But since A ⊆ γ, it must be in V κ = M κ , and so it is in both M and V . Thus, σ = { β α | σ ∈ A } is also in both M and V , as desired. Lemma that X and X[g] have the same ordinals. Since X ∩ ord is a set of ordinals in V of size δ, by the previous lemma it must also be in M . And since A ∈ M , it follows that a = A ∩ X is also in M , and so again by the previous lemma, a is in V . Thus, there is some condition p ∈ g that forces X ∩Ȧ =ǎ. That is to say, p decidesȦ(α)
for every α ∈ X. Thus,
By elementarity, it must be that V ζ also satisfies this, and so p decidesȦ(α) for all α. Thus, A ∈ V , as desired. Lemma
By simply enumerating any set in M , it follows from the previous two lemmas
Proof: Since M ⊆ V by the previous lemma it follows that 
. In order to show
Using enumerations of the sets in V , it suffices to show that j ↾ θ ∈ V for every ordinal θ. And to prove this, it suffices to show that j " θ ∈ V for every ordinal θ.
Let A = j " θ, and suppose by induction that every initial segment of A is in V . By the amenability of the full embedding, we know that A ∈ V [G]. If cof(θ) ≥ δ then A must be in V for otherwise it would be fresh over V , in violation of the Key Lemma.
So I may assume that cof(θ) < δ. Consequently, by the distributivity of Q, it must be that A ∈ V [g], and so A =Ȧ g for some nameȦ ∈ V . Again choose some large ζ and X ≺ V ζ of size δ containingȦ and P as well as every element of P. It follows that X ∩ ord = X[g] ∩ ord. The set X ∩ ord is a set of ordinals of size δ in V , and consequently it is in M by the lemma above. Let a = A ∩ X = A ∩ X[g]. Since this is a subset of j " θ of size δ < κ, it must be equal to j " b = j(b) for some set b ⊆ θ of size δ. By the cover lemma above, there is a set c in both M and V such that b ⊆ c and c has size δ. Now simply compute a = j " b ⊆ (j " c) ∩ X ⊆ (j " θ) ∩ X = a, and so a = (j " c) ∩ X. But j " c = j(c) ∈ M ⊆ V , and so a is in V . Now, continuing as in the previous lemma, there must be a condition p ∈ g forcing this. So p decideṡ A(α) for every α ∈ X. By the elementarity of X ≺ V ζ it must be that p decidesȦ(α)
for every ordinal α. Thus, A is in V , as desired. Lemma
Lemma 7. If the full embedding j : V [G] → M [j(G)] is definable from parameters (such as a measure or extender) in V [G], then the restricted embedding j ↾ V : V → M is definable from the names of those parameters in V .
Proof: This follows actually from the previous lemma. Suppose that j : That is, p forces that the relation ϕ(ǎ,b,ż) for a and b in the appropriate domain produces exactly the set j ↾ V θ . By the Axiom of Replacement, there must be a single p that works for unboundedly many θ. Thus, for this p we know that j(a) = b exactly when p forces ϕ(ǎ,b,ż), for a and b in V . So j ↾ V is definable fromż in
This completes the proof of the theorem. I will nevertheless quickly prove one additional lemma that will assist in the proofs of the corollaries to come. 
Lemma 8. Under the hypothesis of the theorem,
One must take care with strongness embeddings in order to satisfy the closure hypothesis in the theorem. A cardinal κ is λ-strong when there is an embedding j : V → M with critical point κ such that V λ ⊆ M and j(κ) > λ. Let me define that an embedding j : V → M is β-closed when M β ⊆ M . The problem with strongness embeddings, of course, is that they need not satisfy any degree of closure. By factoring through by the canonical extender, however, one obtains a natural embedding, meaning in addition that
And for almost every λ these natural embeddings do satisfy the closure hypothesis of the theorem. Lemma 9. If κ is λ-strong, then the natural λ-strongness embeddings j : V → M are κ-closed if λ is a successor ordinal or a limit ordinal of cofinality above κ, and otherwise they are < cof(λ)-closed.
Proof: It suffices to consider λ > κ. Suppose that j : V → M is a natural λ-
In the first case, suppose that λ = ξ + 1 and j(h α )(s α ) | α < κ is a κ-sequence of elements from M . Since a κ-sequence of subsets of V ξ can be coded with a single subset of V ξ , it follows that s α | α < κ is in M . Also, the
Thus, the sequence j(h α )(s α ) | α < κ is in M , as desired. For the next case, when λ is a limit ordinal of cofinality larger than κ, then on cofinality grounds the sequence s α | α < κ is in V λ , and hence in M , so again j(h α )(s α ) | α < κ is in M , as desired. Finally, suppose λ is a limit ordinal and β < cof(λ) ≤ κ. If j(h α )(s α ) | α < β is a sequence of elements from M , then again on cofinality grounds we know s α | α < β is in V λ and hence in M , and so j(h α )(s α ) | α < β is in M , as desired. Lemma
The consequence of this argument is that except for the limit ordinals of small cofinality, the Gap Forcing Theorem applies to strongness embeddings.
I would like now to prove a series of corollaries to the Gap Forcing Theorem. I hope these corollaries tend to show that for a variety of large cardinals the restrictions identified in the theorem are severe. Proof: I am referring here not just to measures on κ, but to measures on an arbitrary set D, so that the corollary also covers the cases of, for example, supercompactness and hugeness measures. It is a standard fact that any ultrapower
where κ = cp(j). Since the forcing admits a gap below κ, the Gap Forcing Theorem Proof: This is a special case of the previous corollary. Corollary
As a caution to the reader, let me stress that the corollary does not say that every ultrapower embedding j : 
What we actually have is the following:
Corollary 14. After forcing P of size less than δ, no further ≤δ-strategically closed forcing Q can increase the degree of strongness of any cardinal κ > δ.
, the extension by P * Q, and κ > δ. In the first case, when λ is either a successor ordinal or a limit ordinal of cofinality above δ, the previous corollary shows that κ is λ-strong in V and hence also in the small forcing extension V [g]. For the second, more difficult case, suppose that κ is λ-strong
[H] and λ is a limit ordinal with cof(λ) ≤ δ.
be a λ-strong embedding by a canonical extender, so that
Thus, j is the embedding induced by the extender
which is a subset of
This extender is the union of the smaller
for unboundedly many β < λ. By the result of the previous corollary, we may assume that these smaller extenders each extend a strongness extender in V . Since each of these extenders extends uniquely to V [g], the small forcing extension, it follows by the strategic closure ofQ that
The two previous results are complicated somewhat by the intriguing possibility that small forcing could actually increase the degree of strongness of some cardinal.
This question, an unresolved instance of the Levy-Solovay theorem, is raised in [HamWdn] . One could ask the corresponding question replacing small forcing with gap forcing, is it possible that forcing with a gap below κ can increase the degree of strongness of κ? But the truth of the matter is that the previous corollary shows that if gap forcing P * Q can increase the degree of strongness of a cardinal, then this increase is entirely due to the initial small forcing factor P. And the only way this can occur is if a <λ-strong cardinal is made λ-strong for some limit ordinal λ of small cofinality.
Corollary 15. Gap forcing creates no new Woodin cardinals. If κ is Woodin after
forcing with a gap below κ, then κ was Woodin in the ground model.
, then for every A ⊆ κ there is a cardinal γ < κ that is <κ-strong for A, meaning that for every λ < κ there is an embedding
an embedding can be found that is (λ + 1)-strong and induced by the canonical extender, so by Lemma 9 we may assume that M [j(G)] is closed under γ-sequences.
Further, such γ must be unbounded in κ, so we may consider some such γ above the gap in the forcing. Thus, for A in the ground model, the Gap Forcing Theorem shows that the restricted embedding j : V → M witnesses the λ-strongness of γ for A in V , and so κ was a Woodin cardinal in V , as desired. Corollary
Define that a forcing notion is mild relative to κ when every set of ordinals of size less than κ in the extension has a name of size less than κ in the ground model. For example, the reverse Easton iterations one often finds in the literature are generally mild because the tail forcing is usually sufficiently distributive, and so any set of ordinals of size less than κ is added by some stage before κ. Additionally, any κ-c.c. forcing is easily seen to be mild. 
Proof:
The point is that after mild forcing, every strong compactness measure µ on P κ θ in the extension is isomorphic to a strong compactness measureμ that concentrates on (P κ θ) V . To see why this is so, let j :
ultrapower by µ, and let s = [id] µ . Thus, j " θ ⊆ s ⊆ j(θ) and |s| < j(κ). By mildness s has a name in M of size less than j(κ), and using this name we can construct a sets ∈ M such that j " θ ⊆s ⊆ j(θ) and |s| < j(κ) in M . Furthermore, since µ is isomorphic to a measure concentrating on θ, there must be some ordinal
}. I may assume that the largest element ofs has the form α, ζ , using a suitable definable pairing function, by simply adding such a point if necessary. Letμ be the measure germinated bys via j, so that X ∈μ ↔s ∈ j(X). Sinces is a subset of j(θ) of size less than j(κ) in M , it follows thatμ is a fine measure on P κ θ in V [G] that concentrates on (P κ θ) V . I will now show that µ andμ are isomorphic. For this, it suffices by the seed theory of [Ham97] to show that every element of M [j(G)] is in the seed
By the choice ofs we know that ζ ∈ X and so it is easy to conclude that j(h)(ζ) ∈ X for any function h ∈ V [G], as desired. So every strong compactness measure is isomorphic to a strong compactness measure that concentrates on (P κ θ) V .
Now the corollary follows because the restricted embedding j ↾ V : V → M must be definable (with a name for µ as a parameter) in V by the Gap Forcing Theorem, and using this embedding one can recoverμ ∩ V , which is easily seen to be a fine selecting at the n th step either the the image ofμ 0 or ofμ 1 , respectively, depending on the n th digit of x. If κ n | n < ω is the critical sequence of this embedding, then for any X ⊆ κ the standard arguments show that κ n ∈ j(X) if and only if X is in the measure whose image is used at the n th step of the iteration. Suppose now towards a contradiction that the restricted embedding j ↾ V is amenable to V . I will show that from j ↾ P (κ) V one can iteratively recover the digits of x. First, by computing in V the set { X ⊆ κ | κ ∈ j(X) }, we learn which measure was used at the initial step of the iteration and thereby also learn the initial digit of x. This information also tells us the value of κ 1 = j µ x(0) (κ). Continuing, we can compute in V the set { X ⊆ κ | κ 1 ∈ j(X) } to know the next measure that was used and thereby learn the next digit of x and the value of κ 2 , and so on. Thus, from j ↾ P (κ) V in V we would be able to recursively recover x, contradicing the fact that x is not in V . Theorem
The argument works equally well with any small forcing; one simply uses a longer iteration.
